Pricing and Market Structure by Godenhielm, Mats & Kultti, Klaus
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas 
fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Pricing and Market Structure 
 
 
Mats Godenhielm 
University of Helsinki and HECER 
 
and 
 
Klaus Kultti 
University of Helsinki and HECER 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 338 
September 2011 
 
ISSN 1795-0562 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014 
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,  
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi 
HECER 
Discussion Paper No. 338   
 
Pricing and Market Structure* 
 
Abstract 
 
We derive the equilibrium pricing strategies under three often observed market structures 
in a model with one large firm and a competitive fringe of small capacity constrained firms 
under uncertain demand. The pricing strategies reflect the varying levels of frictions and 
within-location competition induced by the market structures. An implication of the 
complexity of the pricing strategies is that a sample of posted prices and a simple index 
based on these is not enough for comparing the market structures in terms of expected 
prices paid. Knowledge of the market structure and expected demand is needed as well.  
 
JEL Classification: D43, L10, L13 
 
Keywords: firm location, market structure, firm size.  
  
 
Mats Godenhielm 
 
Department of Political and Economic 
Studies 
University of Helsinki 
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7) 
FI-00014 
FINLAND  
 
 
e-mail: mats.godenhielm@helsinki.fi  
 Klaus Kultti  
 
Department of Political and Economic 
Studies 
University of Helsinki 
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7) 
FI-00014 
FINLAND 
 
 
e-mail: klaus.kultti@helsinki.fi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Mats Godenhielm wishes to thank Matti Liski and Tanja Saxell for usefull comments. 
Financial support from the Academy of Finland and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation is 
greatly acknowledged.  
1 Introduction
It is often observed that sellers of similar goods, say outdoor equipment, locate close to each other and
that several smaller retailers are found near a larger one. Another frequently observed market structure
is one with several small sellers in the city centre and large retailers in the outskirts of the city. We
analyze the e¤ect that di¤erent market structures have on expected prices and expected utilities and
prots. This can be seen as investigating the e¤ects of price competition between locations versus price
competition within a location.
In our model aggregate supply is much larger than aggregate demand. If there were only one rm it
could charge the monopoly price, whereas if there were two rms (still with enough capacity to satisfy
the whole market) they would engage in Bertrand competition and drive the price down to zero. We
model a market with one large rm (without capacity restrictions) and a competitive fringe of small
capacity constrained rms and analyze the e¤ect these rms have on the prices. Key assumptions are
capacity constraints of the small rms and uncertain demand,1 as they induce the small sellers to use
a mixed pricing strategy whenever they are together at a location2 .
We dene market structure as the locational distribution of rms and analyze how market structure
a¤ects average posted prices, expected utilities, prots as well as the prices actually paid. The settings
that we consider are
(A) All rms are in the same location, this setting can be interpreted as describing a city centre.
(B) The large rm is in one location and all the small rms are in a second location. This setting
can be seen as corresponding to a city center with small rms and a large retailer at the outskirts of
the city.
(C) All rms are at separate locations.
The ordering of the di¤erent market structures by average price and by expected price paid is often
very di¤erent. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, when the small sellers are together in a
location (as in market structures (A) and (B)) they use mixed pricing strategies3 . The cheapest goods
are then bought rst, leading to di¤erences in the average and paid prices when demand is less than
the small rmscapacity. The large rms expected price is higher than that of the small rms in both
market structures (A) and (B).4 Thus, the average prices and the expected prices paid are di¤erent
1Without theese assumptions the analysis would be uninteresting as rms would engage in Bertrand competition and
drive prices to zero whenever demand is smaller than supply at a location. (The mirror case is just as uninterresting;
when demand is at least as large as supply all rms would sell, thus all rms would charge the highest possible price).
2This was rst demonstrated by Prescott (1975).
3The large rm might price using a mixed strategy as well when it is in the same location as the small rms.
4 In market structure (A) no small rm with a price higher than the large rms price sells ever sells. In market structure
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also for high demand realizations. Secondly, when there are several locations as in market structures
(B) and (C) the locations compete for customers a¤ecting the prices. These market structures induce
extra frictions as now some buyers visiting the small sellers are left without the good and not all small
sellers are able to sell even when demand is relatively high. The small rmsprices reect the need to
compensate the buyers for the possibility of being left without the good. It is clear that these frictions
a¤ect market structures (B) and (C) di¤erently as the number of locations and goods per location are
di¤erent. For the reasons above the e¤ect of market structure on prices is highly nontrivial.
The di¤erent market structures lead to di¤erent pricing strategies for both the large and the small
rms. An implication is that a sample of posted prices and a simple index based on these is not enough
for comparing the market structures in terms of expected prices paid. Knowledge of the market structure
and potential demand, or alternatively expected demand, is needed as well. The good news is that it
is possible to construct indices that generate the prices paid as well as utilities and rm prots from a
good sample of posted prices and knowledge of the market structure and expected demand. This can
be useful given that data on prices paid can be hard to come by.
Even when the market structure is known the distribution of the demand can have large and surpris-
ing e¤ects on the pricing behavior of rms. As an example of this consider market structure (A), where
all sellers are together in a single location. In this setting the large seller has a pure pricing strategy
when demand is exponentially distributed whereas it has a mixed pricing strategy with an atom at the
highest price the buyers are willing to pay when demand is uniform.
The rest of the paper is structured the following way. In section two we describe the model and
derive the pricing strategies of the rms under the three market structures. In section 3 we compare the
average prices, the expected prices paid as well as utilities under the di¤erent settings when demand
is uniformly distributed. In section 4 we show that the ranking of the market structures under the
exponential distribution are di¤erent still. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related models
The study of rmschoice of location has a long tradition in economics going back at least to Chamberlin
(1933). More recently rmslocation choice has been analyzed by e.g. Kultti (2008). He considers the
location choice of small capacity constrained rms that have the option of locating close together or
separately. The paper derives the equilibrium prices in both markets and shows that both markets
cannot coexist and that when sellers are allowed to choose markets they choose the clustered market.
(B) the small rms compenste the buyers for the possibility that they are left without a good.
2
Whenever the small rms are together in a location as in market structures (A) and (B) uncertain
demand and capacity constraints induce them to use a mixed pricing strategy. This was rst demon-
strated by Prescott (1975) in his example of hotel competition. Later the e¤ect of demand uncertainty
on pricing has been modelled e.g. by Eden (1990) and Dana (1999). For a dynamic model of price
posting with random demand see Deneckere and Peck (2010).
Whenever there are several locations as in market structures (B) and (C) we model the search
behavior by the buyers similarly as in the directed search literature (see e.g. Moen (1997), Shimer
(1996), Burdet Shi and Wright (2001), Watanabe (2010), or Godenhielm and Kultti (2011), where the
last three papers allow for di¤erent capacities of sellers).
2 The model
There is a unit interval of small sellers who all have one good for sale. In addition there is a large seller
with enough capacity to serve the whole market. There is a continuum m > 1 of potential buyers. The
sellers value the good at zero. The number of actual buyers  in the market is stochastic and follows
distribution H. We assume that the support of H() is [0;m]. The buyers value the good at unity. The
sellers post prices and based on these, as well as on the quantities on o¤er at the di¤erent locations the
buyers decide which location to visit.
Next we analyze the three market structures in detail.
2.1 Market structure (A); All rms in the same location
We assume that all sellersare in the same location. A buyer visiting the location will then choose to
buy the cheapest good (as long as the price is at most unity). If a small rm charges the same price as
the large rm we assume that the buyer prefers the small rm. To nd the equilibrium prices we rst
assume that the large rm uses a pure strategy when all small rms are in the same location with it.
The large rm asks price q. Now in a prospective equilibrium q has to be the highest price. If the large
rm quotes price q = 1 it will trade only when there are more buyers than small rms. As there is a
unit interval of small rms this means that the large rm will trade only when realized demand  > 1:
We next determine whether there is a protable deviation for the large rm to price 1 H(1) from
the prospective equilibrium where the large rm asks price 1. In the candidate equilibrium the large
3
rm earnsZ m
1
( 1)h()d =
Z m
1
h()d [1 H(1)] = m H(1) 
Z m
1
H()d [1 H(1)] = m 1 
Z m
1
H()d;
(1)
where we have partially integrated to get the second equality. It is easy to show that the derivative
of equation (1) is positive with respect to the price. Thus no small deviations exist. Next we look for
larger deviations. A natural place to start is to look at deviations to the lower bound of the support of
the prices of the small rms.
If the large rm quotes price 1 H(1) it can expect the following prot
[1 H(1)]
Z m
0
h()d = m [1 H(1)] 
Z m
0
H()d [1 H(1)] : (2)
where we have, again partially integrated.
The second is greater than the rst if
 mH(1) 
Z 1
0
H()d [1 H(1)] 
Z m
1
H()d [1 H(1)] >  1 +
Z m
1
H()d (3)
which is equivalent to which is equivalent to
1 +H(1) > mH(1) +
Z 1
0
H()d: (4)
Claim 1 Whenever 1 >
R 1
0
H()d+mH(1) H(1) the large rm has a protable deviation from price
unity.
Proof. The proof is sketched above.
An example of a demand distribution (H) for which expression (4) does not hold is the exponential
distribution. We show (in the appendix) that in this case the large rm prices at unity. An example
of a distribution of H for which the expression holds is the uniform distribution. Next we derive the
mixed strategy equilibrium in price when (4) holds.
Let us next derive the mixed strategies of the rms. Denote the small rmsmixed strategy on [a;A]
by F and the large rms mixed strategy on [b; B] by G. Note rst that as long as there are no atoms
B = 1 since otherwise there would be a protable deviation upwards from B. Notice that A = 1 since
otherwise there would be a gap between A and B; in this case the large rm could deviate by choosing
a mass point at B = 1 and choosing prices between A and unity with probability zero. Then, again the
small rms could protably deviate upwards from A.5A small rm would trade with probability zero
5Of course B cannot be less than A since small rms choosing a price above B would never sell.
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if it chose price A = 1 unless the large rm had a mass point at B = 1. This is the equilibrium we
construct denoting the mass at unity by  Finally, let us note that it is quite possible that b > a.
Consider a small rm that chooses price p 2 [a; 1]. Its expected prot is given by
p [1 G(p)]
Z m
F (p)
h()d = p [1 G(p)] [1 H(F (p))] (5)
when p > b, and by
p
Z m
F (p)
h()d = p [1 H(F (p))] (6)
when p  b.
Consider next a large rm that chooses price q 2 [b; 1]. Its expected prot is given by
q
Z m
F (q)
(   F (q))h()d = q
(
m  F (q) 
Z m
F (q)
H()d
)
(7)
Price 1 yields a small rm prot [1 H(1)] , and to the large rm it yields Rm
1
(   1)h()d. We
immediately see that a = [1 H(1)] . Equating the small rmsprot with [1 H(1)]  allows to solve
for
G(p) =
p [1 H(F (p))]  [1 H(1)] 
p [1 H(F (p))] (8)
Now b is determined by G(b) = 0 which is equivalent to
b [1 H(F (b))]  [1 H(1)]  = 0 (9)
From this we immediately see that b = a or equivalently b = [1 H(1)] when H(F (b)) = 0.
The small rmsstrategy is determined by the equality of prots for the large rm
q
(
m  F (q) 
Z m
F (q)
H()d
)
=
Z m
1
(   1)h()d (10)
One would like to show that in (12) the LHS becomes zero at some value b > [1 H(1)] , and to solve
F from (13). This is, however, not possible unless one considers an explicit distribution H. To that end
we focus on a uniform distribution6 . Now (12) becomes
b

1  F (b)
m

  [1 H(1)]  = 0 (11)
and (13) becomes
q

m  F (q)  1
2
m2   F (q)2
m

=
1
2
m2   1
m
  m  1
m
(12)
This is equivalent to
qF (q)2   2mqF (q) +m2q   (m  1)2 = 0 (13)
6We derive the explicit pricing strategies under the exponential distribution in the appendix.
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From this one solves
F (q) =
mq   (m  1)pq
q
(14)
Claim 2 The unique mixed strategy of the small rms is F (q) = mq (m 1)
p
q
q : The support is
h 
m 1
m
2
; 1
i
Proof. The proof is by construction above.
Inserting the condition F ([1 H(1)] ) = F  m 1m  = 0 and solving yields  = m 1m .
Now we can solve for
G(p) = 1  m  1
m
p
p
(15)
Claim 3 The large rm uses a unique mixed strategy G(p) = 1   m 1mpp with probability 1   , with
probability  the large rm uses prices at unity.
Proof. The proof is by construction above.
Thus, in equilibrium the small rms price using mixed strategy F with support [a; 1] ; and earn
expected prots of [1 H(1)]  =  m 1m 2 : The large rm uses mixed strategy G(p) with support [a; 1),
it has an atom at price unity. The probability that the large rm has price one is prot is  = m 1m :
The expected prot of the large rm is m  1  Rm
1
H()d:
2.2 Market structure (B); Large rm and small rms in two separate loca-
tions
We next consider price and expected utilities when the small rms are located together in one location
but separately from the large rm. Kultti (2008) considered a model with small sellers and showed that
they prefer to locate close together to locating separately. We proceed to nd equilibrium prices and
expected utilities in this case.
Assume that fraction z of buyers go to small rms and fraction 1  z go to the large rm. Then the
small rms set their price using a mixed strategy with support7 [a;A], and the large rm quotes price
PB . As before, it is clear that F (A) = F (1) = 1.
A small rm quoting price 1 can then expect to get (1 H( 1z )). As the expected prot must be the
same over the support we easily nd that a =
 
1 H( 1z

):
Any price  2 [a; 1] yields


1 H

F ()
z

= 1 H

1
z

(16)
From this we solve the mixed strategy of the small rms.
7 It is clear that A=1 as a small rm pricing A would otherwise have a deviation to 1.
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F () = zH 1
 
   1 H   1z 

!
(17)
A large rm can expect the following prot
PB
Z m
0
(1  z)h()d = (PB) (18)
To continue we rst look at the expected utilities of buyers that go to the small rms. The small
rms set their prices using a mixed strategy. To make calculations easier we follow Kultti (2008) and
assume that all sellers charge the virtual price z described below. We denote the expected utility of
buyers visiting the small rms by u(z; F ): A buyer going to a large seller knows that he can expect to
get 1  PB :
In equilibrium the following must hold:
u(z; F ) = 1  PB (19)
and
0(PB) = 0: (20)
To solve this set of equations we begin by looking at the small rmspricing decision. To simplify
we let every small rm asks the same price r, where r can be thought of as the virtual price that gives
the sellers the same expected prot as the sellers would get using the mixed strategy F derived above.
We get
r
Z 1
z
0
z
1
h()d +

1 H

1
z

r = 1 H

1
z

: (21)
In the rst term on the LHS we integrate over levels of demand when there are fewer buyers than
small sellers, the second term corresponds to levels of demand is higher than the number of sellers at
the small rmslocation. Forcing the LHS to equal the expected prot from the mixed strategy we solve
the small sellers virtual price
r =
 
1 H   1z 
1 H   1z + R 1z0 z1 h()d : (22)
As the total number of trades is the same when using the virtual price r as under the sellers mixed
strategy F so is the expected utility to the buyers visiting the small rmslocation.
This allows us to rewrite the buyersindi¤erence condition as
7
(1  r) 1
E()
"Z 1
z
0
h () d +
Z m
1
z
1
z
h()d
#
= 1  PB : (23)
The LHS is the buyersexpected utility from visiting the small rmslocation, the RHS is the buyers
expected utility from visiting the large rm. It is clear that PB  1 as no buyer would otherwise visit
the large rm.
The large rm maximizes
max
PB
Z m
0
(1  z) h()d  PB
. The rst order conditions are:
Z m
0
(1  z) h()d  
Z m
0
dz
dPB
h()d  PB = 0 (24)
We get dzdPB by totally di¤erentiating the buyers indi¤erence condition. We then solve for the large
rms price which after some simple algebra simplies to
PB =
(1  z)
h
E()  R 1z
0
h () d + h( 1z )
1
z2
i
E()
; (25)
as
Rm
0
h()d = E():The expected prot E (L) of the large rm is
E (L) = (1  z)E()  PB
= (1  z)2
"
E() 
Z 1
z
0
h () d + h(
1
z
)
1
z2
#
: (26)
Claim 4 When the large rm is in one location and all small rms are in another location the large
rm has a unique price PB which is a function of z and m dened in (24). The small rms have a
unique mixed strategy F () which is a function of z and m and is dened in (21).
Proof. The proof is above by construction.
2.3 Market structure (C); All rms in di¤erent locations
Now assume that all rms are in di¤erent locations. Assume that proportion z of buyers visit the small
rms and proportion 1 z visit the large seller. In equilibrium the buyers are indi¤erent between visiting
the large rm or mixing over the small rms.
In equilibrium the price of the small sellers is
q =
Rm
0
 
1  e z   ze zh()dRm
0
(1  e z)h()d (27)
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The only di¤erence to the price derived in a standard directed search model with just capacity one
rms is z, the proportion of buyers going to the small sellers, which we will later derive. Next we go on
by deriving the price of the large rm.
By going to the small rms a buyer thus expects to get
(1  q)
Rm
0
 
1  ze z
z
g()d (28)
where
Rm
0 (1 ze z)
z g()d is the probability of getting the good by when the buyer visits a small
rm. Again as g() = h()E() we can rewrite the above as
1
E()
Z m
0
e zh()d:
Thus we again proceed by writing the buyers indi¤erence condition between visiting a small seller
or the large seller.
1
E()
Z m
0
e zh()d = 1  PC (29)
The large rms price is found by maximizing the large rms expected prot with respect to P.
The large rm maximizes
max
PC

PC  (1  z)
Z m
0
h()d

(30)
The FOC is
(1  z)
Z m
0
h()d  
Z m
0
dz
dPC
h()d  PC = 0; (31)
where we nd dzdPC by totally di¤erentiating the buyers indi¤erence condition. We can now solve
for the large rms price.
PC =
(1  z) Rm
0
2e zh()d
E()
(32)
To see that PC is unique we show that there is a unique z 2 [0; 1] that solves the buyersindi¤erence
condition 1E()
Rm
0
e zh()d = 1  PC :
We get
E() 
Z m
0
e zh()d = (1  z)
Z m
0
2e zh()d (33)
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We begin by renaming the LHS and RHS of (33) as f(z) and g(z) respectively. As f(0) = 0 and
g(0) = E(2); f(1) = E()  Rm
0
e h()d > 0 and g(1) = 0; and f 0(z) =
Rm
0
2e zh()d > 0 and
g0(z) =
Rm
0
2e zh()d   (1  z) Rm
0
3e zh()d < 0; the result is immediate.
Hence PC is unique.
Claim 5 When all sellers are separate the small sellers have a unique price q and the large seller has
a unique price PC dened as in (26) and (32)
Proof. The proof can be found above
3 Market structure, utility and pricing
In this section we derive the expected prices actually paid in the market as well as the expected utilities
of the buyers in the three market structures under consideration. After this we compare the di¤erent
market structures.
3.1 Expected price paid under market structure A (EPPA)
We now have the pricing functions for the rms under three di¤erent market structures. In order to
answer questions regarding utilities and pricing under the di¤erent regimes we need to look at specic
distributional forms of H. To this end we will assume that H follows the uniform distribution. Thus
when all rms are in the same location we know from section 2.1 that the small rms price using mixed
prices.
The expected price in the market is
1
m+ 1
Z 1
a
qf(q)dq +
m
m+ 1
Z 1
a
pg(p)dp+
m  1
m
 1

(34)
=
1
m (m+ 1)
 
m2 +m  2
Next we nd the expected price paid in the market. We begin by assuming that the large rm asks
price q. Then as long as   F (q) only the small rms sell and when  > F (q) both types of rms sell.
The expected price paid given that the large rm quotes price q is thus

 (q) =
Z F (q)
0
Z F 1()
a
qf(q)dqh()d +
Z m
F (q)
q

(   F (q))h()d +
Z m
F (q)
Z q
a
qF (q)

f(q)dqh()d: (35)
where the rst term is the expected price of the small rms when demand is   F (q) multiplied by
the probability that demand is at this level. When demand is higher than F (q); the amount F (q) of the
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buyers buy the good from the small sellers and the rest buy the good from the large seller. The second
and third terms capture this. The second term is the price of the large rm multiplied by the probability
that a buyer buys from the large rm times the probability that demand is higher than F (q): The third
term is the expected price when buying from a small rm when demand is high  > F (q) multiplied
by the probability that a buyer gets to acquire the good from a small rm times the probability that
demand is high.
To get the expected price paid under market structure (A) (EPPA) we need to integrate over the
possible prices of the large rm. The following expression captures the idea8 :
EPPA =
Z 1
a

 (q) g (q) dq
+   1
 Z 1
0
Z F () 1
a
qf(q)dqh()d +
Z m
1
1
(   1)

 1h()d +
Z m
1
Z 1
a
q

f(q)dqh()d()
!
:
(36)
The rst term in EPPA is just 
 (q) integrated over the prices in the support of the large rm. The
large rm has an atom at price unity. The second term is the probability  that the large rm prices at
unity times the expected price paid when it does so. The terms in the parenthesis can be interpreted
in a similar fashion as the terms in 
 (q) with q replaced by 1:
In section 4 we depict the expected price paid as a function of potential demand m.
3.2 Expected price paid under market structure B (EPPB)
We begin by looking at the situation for the large rm. First we show that the large rm has a unique
pricing strategy given the proportion z of buyers going to the small rms. To solve for z we equate (22)
with (24), and let H follow the uniform distribution, thus we nd that the proportion of buyers going
to the small rms is
z =   1
3m2 3
rq
1
m4 +
1
27m6 +
1
m2
+
3
sr
1
m4
+
1
27m6
+
1
m2
(37)
This expression is convex and decreasing as well as between 1 and 0 when m > 1.
8We derive the expression for the expected price paid under market structure A (EPPA) more explicitely in the
appandix
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With the expression for z at hand we can now solve for the price of the large rm as a function of
potential demand m. The price of the large rm is
PB =
(1  z)
h
E()  R 1z
0
h () d + h( 1z )
1
z2
i
E()
=
 
m2z2 + 1
 (1  z)
m2z2
:
where the second equality is a result of the assumption of an uniform H.
Now we are ready to derive the expression for the expected price paid. It is
(1  z)  PB + z 
 Z 1
z
0
Z F 1(z)
a
qf(q)dqh()d +
Z m
1
z
Z 1
a
qf(q)
1

dqh()d
!
: (38)
The lower bound of the support of the mixed strategy of the small rms is
a = 1 H(1
z
) =
zm  1
zm
:
When H is uniform the small rms mixed strategy is
F (q) = zm

q   1 + 1zm
q

=
1
q
(mzq  mz + 1)
Thus
f(q) =
1
q2
(mz   1)
and
F 1(z) =
mz   1
z (m  ) ;
when  2 0; 1z  :
Thus the expected price paid when the large rm is in a di¤erent location than the small rms is9
EPPB = (1  z)  PB + z 
 Z 1
z
0
Z mz 1
z(m )
zm 1
zm
q
1
q2
(mz   1)
m
dqd +
Z m
1
z
Z 1
zm 1
zm
q
1
q2
(mz   1)
m
1

dqd
!
The rst term of EPPB is just the price of the large rm C times the probability (1   z) that
a random buyer visits this rm. The second term consists of z multiplied by a parenthesis of which
9EPP2 simplies to
(1  z)   m2z2 + 1 (1  z)
m2z2
+ z

1
m
(mz   1) + (mz   1) ln

m  1
m

+
1
m
(mz   1) ln

m
m  1

+

ln
1
zm

ln
1
z
(mz   1)  lnm

mz   1
m

(39)
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the rst term is the expected price of the small rms when demand is low (< 1z ) multiplied by the
probability that this happens. The second term in the parenthesis is the expected price of the small
rms when they face high demand (> 1z ) multiplied by the probability that demand is high multiplied
by 1 , the measure of goods divided by the measure of small rms ( i.e. the probability that a buyer
gets the good). (Note that when demand is low the buyer always manages to acquire the good even by
visiting the small rms as there are then less buyers than there are small rms.)
Claim 6 When the large rm and the small rms are in two di¤erent locations the expected price paid
is given by EPPB.
Proof. The proof is by construction and can be found above
3.3 Expected prices paid under market structure C (EPPC)
Now assume that all rms are in di¤erent locations. Assume that proportion z of buyers visit the small
rms and proportion 1 z visit the large seller. In equilibrium the buyers are indi¤erent between visiting
the large rm or mixing over the small rms.
As derived earlier the equilibrium price of the small sellers is
q =
Rm
0
 
1  e z   ze z dRm
0
(1  e z) d =
2e mz +mz +mze mz   2
e mz +mz   1 ; (40)
where the second equality results from imposing the uniform distribution on H.
The expected utility of a buyer going to a small rm is (1   q) times the probability of ending up
with the good. This is
(1  q)
Z m
0
 
1  e z
z
g()d =  2e
 mz +mze mz   1
m2z2
:
as g() = h()E() and H is uniform.
In equilibrium a buyer has to be indi¤erent between visiting a small seller or the large seller. Thus
 2e
 mz +mze mz   1
m2z2
= 1  PC ; (41)
allowing us to solve for the price of the large rm
PC = 1 + 2
e mz +mze mz   1
m2z2
=
2e mz +m2z2 + 2mze mz   2
m2z2
: (42)
The proportion z of buyers visiting the small rms is found by maximizing the large rms expected
prot with respect to z.
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The large rm maximizes
max
z

2e mz +m2z2 + 2mze mz   2
m2z2
 (1  z)
Z m
0
h()d

(43)
The FOC is
  1
2mz3
 
2z + 4e mz   2ze mz +m2z3 + 2m2z2e mz   2m2z3e mz + 4mze mz   2mz2e mz   4 = 0;
(44)
This expression allows us to solve for z as a function of m. We are , however, not able to do so
analytically but instead solve it numerically for specic values of m.
The expected price paid in the market is10
EPPC = (1  z)  P + z  q  2
m2
Z m
0
e zd (45)
The expected price paid when all sellers are at separate locations (EPPC) is just the probability
that a buyer goes to the large seller (1   z) times the large sellers price PC plus the probability that
a buyer goes to the small sellers times the small sellers price q times the probability by which a buyer
gets the good by visiting a small seller.
Claim 7 When the large rm and the small rms are in two di¤erent locations the expected price paid
is given by EPPC.
Proof. Above by construction.
3.4 Comparing the expected prices and prots
In this section we compare the three market structures when demand H follows the uniform distribution.
In the picture below we show the expected prices as a function of potential demand m. We begin by
describing the market structure (A) where all sellers are in the same location (denoted by red in the
picture). For large values of m (' 3) the large rm prices at unity with a relatively high probability
(> 23 ): In addition the lower bound of the supports of the mixed strategies of both the large rm and the
small rms is
 
m 1
m
2
which is increasing and approaches 1 in the limit as m approaches innity. For
10EPPC simplies to
(1  z) 2e
 mz +m2z2 + 2mze mz   2
m2z2
+ z
2e mz +mz +mze mz   2
e mz +mz   1

  1
m2z2
 
2e mz + 2mze mz   2
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small values of demand, e.g. when m approaches unity (from above) the probability  = m 1m that the
large rm prices at unity approaches zero. Also the lower bound of the support of the pricing strategies
of both the large rm and the small rms tends towards zero when m tends to unity. At values of m at
unity or below there will be Bertrand competition and all rms will o¤er prices of zero.
In market structure (B), with two locations, values of m at or below unity lead to Bertrand compe-
tition and zero price just as in the one location case. For values of potential demand m above unity the
average price is, however, always lower in market structure (B) than in market structure (A).
In market structure (C), where all sellers are separate, the sellers enjoy a locational monopoly and
thus there is no competition within a location that would drive prices to zero even if m is below unity.
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Picture 1: Expected prices
Average prices: market structures A (red), B (blue), C (green)
The expected price actually paid is lower than the average price in both market structures (A) and
(B). This is clear as the buyers gobble up the cheapest goods upon arrival at a location. When all rms
are separate the average price of the small rms is the same as the expected price paid when visiting
the small rms. Likewise the price of the large rm is the same. The expected price paid is, however,
lower than the average price. The reason is simply that the large rms share of all trades is smaller
than its share of all goods and the large rms price is higher than the small rmsprice. The expected
price actually paid is thus lower than the average price for all market structures.
More interesting is that the di¤erences in the expected prices paid (EPPA, EPPB and EPPC)
compared to the average prices in the three market structures are large enough to change the order of
"expensiveness" for even quite large potential demands (values of m up to around four). This means
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that a sample of posted prices a simple index is not enough for comparing the market structures in terms
of expected prices paid or welfare. One needs to know the market structure and potential demand as
well as the form of the demand distribution to be able to do so.
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Picture 2: Expected prices paid
EPPA (red), EPPB (blue), EPPC (green)
3.4.1 Expected prots in the three market structures
In this subsection we analyze how the large seller and small sellers fare in the di¤erent market structures.
We nd that the large rm always prefers market structure (A) to market structure (B). When potential
demand is low (m / 1:9) the large rm is even better o¤ in market structure (C) where all rms are
separate. The reason is that both in market structure (A) and in market structure (B) competition
within the small sellerslocation drives the prices towards down zero when m approaches one. In both
of these market structures the large rm then has to respond by lowering its expected price as well.
When all sellers are separate there is no within location competition to drive the prices to zero when
m approaches one as discussed in connection to the average prices. Market structure (C) becomes
relatively worse for the large seller compared to the other market structures when m becomes larger.
The reason for this is that the capacity constraints of the small rmslocations forces them to quote
relatively low prices even for high values of m. This in turn means that the large rm must quote a
low price as well (A direct consequence is e.g. that the large rm never quotes price unity) in order to
entice any buyers to visit its location.
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Picture 3: Large firm's profit
Large rms prot; A (red), B (blue), C (green)
Proposition 8 The large rm is better-o¤ in market structure (A) than in market structure (B)
Proof. The proof is by simple calculation of the expected prots of the large rm.
Proposition 9 The small rms are better o¤ in market structure (B) than in market structure (A)
when potential demand is low11 , otherwise they are better of together with the large rm.
The result is obtained by comparing the expected prots of the small rms under the di¤erent market
structures. First note that the small rms want to be in a market structure where they are all separate
only when m is very close to one (m<1.065) for reasons discussed above. When all rms are located
together a small rm expects to get (1 H(1)) , with H uniform this is equal to  m 1m 2. When the
large rm is located separately from the small rms the small rms expect to receive 1 H( 1z ) with H
uniform this is 1   1zm . Substituting () for z it is easy to verify that the small rms are better-o¤ in
market structure (B) than in market structure (A) when m / 2:27.
11When H is uniform low means m / 2:27
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Picture 4: A small firm's profit
A small rms prot; A (red), B (blue), C (green)
3.4.2 Expected utility of the buyers
The expected utility of the buyers in the three market structures is straightforward to calculate. When
all rms are together it is just
1  EPPA;
as all buyers are always served. When the large rm and the small rms are at two di¤erent locations
a buyer must be indi¤erent visiting the two locations. As the large rm has enough capacity to satisfy
the whole market the expected utility of a buyer is simply one minus the large rms price i.e.
1  PB(z(m);m):
The expected utility when all sellers are separate is analogous to the two locations case. The expected
utility of a buyer when all sellers are separate is thus simply12
1  PC(z(m);m):
Picture () shows the expected utilities as functions of potential demand m. We immediately see that
also the ordering of the curves depends on potential demand.
For relatively low m (/5) the buyers are best o¤ in market structure (A) (the red curve). In this
setting there are no frictions and competition within the location keeps the prices low. As m grows the
12Not that the zs are di¤erent for the two relevant market structures
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probability that the large rm prices at unity increases. So does the lower bound of the support of the
mixed strategies of both the large and the small rms. These e¤ects are large enough to overcome the
costs of the frictions (some of the buyers visiting the small rms are left without a good) inherent in
the other two market structures so that for a high m ('15.5) market structure (A) actually becomes
the worst for the buyers.
Market structure (B) (the blue curve) is worse for the buyers than market structure (A) for values
of m lower than 15.5 for the reasons just described. The between locations competition, however,
means that the large rm never prices at unity in the two-locations setting. In fact, with high potential
demand the prices will still be low enough to compensate for the loss of the cost from frictions compared
to market structure (A). Market structure (B) is thus better then market structure (A) for high vales
of potential demand.
When all rms are separate (the green curve) the cost of frictions are at their highest. There is
competition between locations but no within location competition to drive prices to zero when potential
demand is low. For small values of potential demand (m / 2) the last e¤ect dominates and market
structure (C) is actually the best for buyers.
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Picture 5: Expected utilities
Expected utilities; A (red), B (blue), C (green)
3.5 Exponential distribution
In this section we compare the market structures when demand follows the exponential distribution. The
reason we have chosen the exponential distribution is that it leads to quite di¤erent pricing strategies
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compared to when demand is uniform. This is true especially for market structure A, where the large
rm has a pure strategy price of unity when demand is exponential.13 As the pricing equilibria in all
three market structures are unique also when demand is exponential the comparison of the three market
structures is informative.
Realized demand  follows the exponential distribution bH () = 1  e  and the support of bH is
[0:1]. There is thus no upper bound for potential demand. In order to compare the outcomes to those
in the uniform demand case we use the fact that the expected demand is 1 when
bH is exponential and
m
2 when H is uniform. Thus we let
 =
2
m
:
The fact that the support of bH under the exponential demand is unbounded from above has the
immediate e¤ect that within-location competition will not drive prices to zero when all rms are together
even for values of m at or below unity. When bH is exponential the large rm will interestingly have
a pure pricing strategy at unity when all sellers are in the same location (market structure (A)). The
expected price of the large rm is thus higher than under the uniform distribution. The expected prices
paid are driven down toward zero by competition between the small rms for low values of m, just as
when demand is uniform. (The e¤ect of the large rms price unity is that the expected prices under
market structure (A) remain above zero even for very small levels of demand.) Under market structure
(C) all rms have a locational monopoly thus protecting them from within-location competition that
would drive the expected prices paid to zero for low levels of expected demand.(see picture 7)
The three pictures below compare the market structures under the exponential distribution. Given
m the relative ordering of the expected price, expected price paid and the expected utilities di¤er quite
a lot compared to when H is uniform as can be seen by comparing pictures 6-9 with pictures 1,2 and 5.
Except for the e¤ect of the changes in the large rms pricing strategy when all rms are together the
intuitions from the uniform H cases are valid.
13We derive the pricing strategies of the rms under exponential demand in the appendix
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Picture 6: Expected prices (exponential demand)
Market structures A (red), B (blue), C (green)
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Picture 7: Expected prices paid (exponentional demand)
EPPA (red), EPPB (blue), EPPC (green)
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Picture 8: Expected utilities (exponential demand)
Expected utilities, A (red), B (blue), C (green)
4 Conclusion
We derive the equilibrium pricing strategies under three often observed market structures in a model
with one large rm and a competitive fringe of small rms. These pricing strategies are nontrivial and
interesting in themselves as they reect the varying levels of frictions and within-location competition
induced by the market structures at di¤erent levels of expected demand. An implication of the complex-
ity of the pricing strategies is that a sample of posted prices and a simple index based on these is not
enough for comparing the market structures in terms of expected prices paid. Knowledge of the market
structure and potential demand, or alternatively expected demand, is needed as well. The good news is
that it is possible to construct indices that generate the prices paid as well as utilities and rm prots
from a good sample of posted prices and knowledge of the market structure and expected demand. This
can be useful given that data on prices paid can be hard to come by.
In addition to knowledge of the market structure also the specic distribution of realized demand
is needed to describe the sellerspricing strategies. This becomes most apparent in market structure
(A), where all sellers are in the same location; we show that the large rm has a unique pure price at
unity when demand is exponential and a mixed pricing strategy with an atom at unity when demand
is uniformly distributed.
The logical next step would be to endogenize the market structure. This, however, leads to surprising
technical di¢ culties even with the simple demand distributions considered in this article and will be
22
left for future work.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Appedix 1 : Deriving the pricing strategies in market structure (B)
In section (2.2) we saw that the in equilibrium the following must hold:
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u(z; F ) = 1  PB (46)
and
0(PB) = 0: (47)
Next we look at the small rmspricing decision. We pretend that every small rm asks the same
price r, where r can be thought of as the expected price when sellers use mixed strategies. We get
r
Z 1
z
0
z
1
h()d +

1 H

1
z

r =

1 H

1
z

A: (48)
From this we solve the small sellers expected price
r =
 
1 H   1z A
1 H   1z + R 1z0 z1 h()d (49)
Then the buyersexpected utility conditional on being alive is
(1  r)
"Z 1
z
0
g () d +
Z m
1
z
1
z
g () d
#
; (50)
where g() = h()E() :
The buyer must be indi¤erent between visiting the large rm and going to the small rms.
(1  r)
"Z 1
z
0
g () d +
Z m
1
z
1
z
g () d
#
= 1  PB (51)
it is clear that PB  1:
Using (25) we write 1  r as
1  r = 1 H
 
1
z

+
R 1
z
0
zh()d    1 H   1z A
1 H   1z + R 1z0 zh()d
=
R 1
z
0
zh()d +
 
1 H   1z  (1 A)
1 H   1z + R 1z0 zh()d = 1 
A
1 H   1z + R 1z0 zh()d (52)
Now we look at the rest of the LHS of (27). Remembering that g() = h()E() we getZ 1
z
0
g () d +
Z m
1
z
1
z
g () d
=
Z 1
z
0
h()
E()
d +
Z m
1
z
1
z
h()
E()
d
=
1
E()
"Z 1
z
0
h()d +
1
z
Z m
1
z
h()d
#
(53)
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Partially integrating the rst term in the last equation the expression becomes
1
E()
(
[H()]
1
z
0  
Z 1
z
0
H()d +
1
z

1 H(1
z
)
)
; (54)
which simplies to
1
E()
(
1
z
 
Z 1
z
0
H()d
)
(55)
We can now rewrite the buyers indi¤erence condition (22) as
1  PB =
R 1
z
0
zh()d +
 
1 H   1z  (1 A)
1 H   1z + R 1z0 zh()d 
1
E()
(
1
z
 
Z 1
z
0
H()d
)
(56)
Partially integrating
R 1
z
0
H()d and simplifying the buyers indi¤erence condition becomes
1  PB =
R 1
z
0
zh()d +
 
1 H   1z  (1 A)
zE()
: (57)
Then
PB =
zE()  R 1z
0
zh()d    1 H   1z  (1 A)
zE()
: (58)
The large rm maximizes
Rm
0
(1  z) h()d  PB . The rst order conditions are:
Z m
0
(1  z) h()d  
Z m
0
dz
dPB
h()d  PB = 0 (59)
We get dzdPB by totally di¤erentiating the buyers indi¤erence condition. Rewriting the buyers indif-
ference condition (33) we get
zE()(1  PB) 
Z 1
z
0
zh()d  

1 H

1
z

(1 A) = 0 (60)
Totally di¤erentiating the expression we get
dPB f zE()g+
dz
(
E()(1  PB) 
Z 1
z
0
h () d +
1
z2
h

1
z

  1
z2
h

1
z

+Ah

1
z

1
z2
)
(61)
= 0
From which we solve
dz
dPB
=
zE ()
E()(1  PB) 
R 1
z
0
h () d +Ah
 
1
z
  
1
z2
 (62)
Therefore the rst order condition becomesZ m
0
(1  z) h()d   zE ()
E()(1  PB) 
R 1
z
0
h () d +Ah
 
1
z
  
1
z2
 Z m
0
h()d  PB = 0 (63)
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We get
E()
Z m
0
(1  z) h()d   E()PB
Z m
0
(1  z) h()d  
Z m
0
(1  z) h()d
Z 1
z
0
h () d (64)
+
Z m
0
(1  z) h()dAh

1
z

1
z2

  zE()
Z m
0
h()d  PB
= 0
From which we solve the large rms price
P B =
E()
Rm
0
(1  z) h()d   Rm
0
(1  z) h()d  R 1z
0
h () d +
Rm
0
(1  z) h()d Ah( 1z ) 1z2
E()
Rm
0
h()d
(65)
Which simplies to
P B =
(1  z)
h
E()  R 1z
0
h () d +Ah( 1z )
1
z2
i
E()
; (66)
as
Rm
0
h()d = E():The expected prot E (L) of the large rm is
E (L) = (1  z)E()  PB
= (1  z)2
"
E() 
Z 1
z
0
h () d + h(
1
z
)
1
z2
#
; (67)
where we have used the fact that A; the upper bound of the support of the small rmspricing
strategies, must be equal to 1.
5.2 Appendix 2: Deriving the price paid in market structure (A)
We begin by looking at the expected price paid when the large rm quotes price 1.
  1
 Z 1
0
Z F () 1
a
qf(q)dqh()d +
Z m
1
1
(   1)

 1h()d +
Z m
1
Z 1
a
1

f(q)dqh()d()
!
=

m  1
m
2 
(m  1)2
m

ln

m
m  1

  1
m

+ 1  lnm
m
  1
m
+
1
m2
(lnm) (m  1)
!
Next we look at
R 1
a

 (q) g (q) dq. The rst term in the integrand can be written as
(m  1)2
m

ln

m
m  F (q)

  F (q)
m

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The second term in the integrand simplies toZ m
F (q)
q

(   F (q)) 1
m
d
=

  1
m
p
q (ln   m ln   pq +mpq ln )
m
F (q)
=
1
m
p
q
0@ m+ ln 1pq  mpq  m+ 1  lnm m ln 1pq  mpq  m+ 1
+m lnm+m
p
q ln 1pq
 
m
p
q  m+ 1 mpq lnm  1
1A :
The third term can be written asZ m
F (q)
Z q
a
q

f(q)dqh()dF (q) = F (q)
Z m
F (q)
1

 p
q(m  1)  (m  1)
2
m
!
h()d
= F (q)
m  1
m2

ln
m
F (q)

m
p
q  m+ 1

=
1
m2
p
q

ln
mq
mq   (m  1)pq

(m  1) (mpq  m+ 1)2 :
Now Z 1
a

 (q) g (q) dq
=
Z 1
a

 (q)

m  1
2m

q 
3
2 dq
The expected price paid when the large rm asks price 1 multiplied by the probability that the large
rm asks price 1 is

m  1
m
2 
(m  1)2
m

ln

m
m  1

  1
m

+ 1  lnm
m
  1
m
+
1
m2
(lnm) (m  1)
!
:
The expected price paid assuming that the large rm mixes multiplied by the probability that this
happens is
0@ 1
2m
(m  1)
0@ m+mln 1m2 (m  1)2  m 1m 
+m

ln m
2
(m 1)2
  
m 1
m
  1
1A  1
2m3
(m  1)3
 
m+m ln
m2
(m  1)2   1
!1A
+
0@ m  1
2m

1
m
Z 1
(m 1m )
2
0@ m+ ln 1pq  mpq  m+ 1  lnm m ln 1pq  mpq  m+ 1
+m lnm+m
p
q ln 1pq
 
m
p
q  m+ 1 mpq lnm  1
1A q 1dq
1A
+
 Z 1
(m 1m )
2
1
m2

ln
mq
mq   (m  1)pq

(m  1) (mpq  m+ 1)2

m  1
2m

q 2dq
!
:
Below we plot the expected price paid as a function of m.
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The expected price actually paid as a function of m
5.3 Appendix 3: Deriving the expected prices when bH is exponential
5.3.1 Market structure (A); all rms in the same location
We assume that all sellersare in the same location. A buyer visiting the location will then choose to
buy the cheapest good (as long as the price is at most 1). If a small rm charges the same price as
the large rm we assume that the buyer prefers the small rm. To nd the equilibrium prices we rst
assume that the large operator uses pure strategy when all small operators are in the same location
with it. The large operator asks price q. Now in a prospective equilibrium q has to be the highest price.
The large operator is assumed to have unlimited capacity. If the large rm quotes price q = 1 it will
trade only assuming that there are more buyers than small rms.
Assume bH follows exponential distribution with support [0;1)
We next determine whether there is a protable deviation for the large rm to price 1  bH(1) from
the prospective equilibrium where the large rm asks price 1. In the candidate equilibrium the large
rm earns Z 1
1
(   1)bh()d = Z 1
1
bh()d   h1  bH(1)i = Z 1
1
e d   e  = 1

e  (68)
A small player with price 1 makes
Z 1
1
e d = e 
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It is, again, easy to see that the small players use mixed strategy F with support

e ; 1

Consider a small rm that chooses price p 2 e ; 1. Its expected prot is given by
p
Z 1
F (p)
bhe d = pe F (p) = e  (69)
as ln p  F (p) =   as F (p) = ln p+ .
The large rm doesnt have a protable deviation as asking price y2  e ; 1 yields
y
Z 1
F (y)
e  (   F (y)) d
= y
 
  e 1
F (y)
+
Z 1
F (y)
e d + F (y)

e 
1
F (y)
!
=
y

e F (y) =
y

e  ln y =
1

e : (70)
The large rm asks price 1, the small rms use mixed strategy
F (p) =
ln p+ 

(71)
with support p 2 e ; 1
f(p) =
@
@p
+ ln p

=
1
p
=
1
p
(72)
Note that the equilibrium where the large rm asks price unity and the small rms mix using
F (p) = ln p+ is unique. Below we sketch the proof. Assume rst that both rms have mixed strategies.
Denote the small rmsmixed strategy on
hea; eAi by eF and the large rms mixed strategy on heb; eBi
by eG. Note rst that as long as there are no atoms eB = 1 since otherwise there would be a protable
deviation upwards from eB for the large rm. Notice that eA = 1 since otherwise there would be a gap
between eA and eB; in this case the large rm could deviate by choosing a mass point at eB = 1 and
choosing prices between eA and unity with probability zero.14 A small rm would trade with probability
zero if it chose price eA = 1 unless the large rm had a mass point at eB = 1. Next we consider this
equilibrium denoting the mass at unity by e.
Now a small rm pricing at unity makes e R1
1
e d = ee . It is clear that eb cannot be smaller
than ea or the large rm would have a protable deviation from price eb to price ea. Thus eb  ea and
ea = ee .as it is in the support of the small rms. Now it is clear that eb > ea as otherwise the large
14Of course B cannot be less than A since small rms choosing a price above B would never sell.
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rm would have a deviation to unity where it makes 1e
  (at eb = ea it would get the whole demand but
still make only
R1
1
bh()d = ee ). In the case where eb > ea it must be that the small rms mixed
strategy eF (p) = F (p) = ln p+ as for eF (y) > F (y) the large rm would again have a deviation to unity
(as can be seen from eqv (70)). But as eb > ea eF (p) = F (p) at eb is impossible. Thus there cannot exist
a mixed strategy for the large rm.
To scale assume that  = 2m
The expected price is
m
m+ 1
+
R 1
0

1
   e
 


e d
m+ 1
=
m
m+ 1
 
Z 1
0
e 
2
m  d
e 
2
m   1
m+ 1
(73)
The expected price actually paid is
Z 1
0
Z F 1()
a
pf(p)dpbh()d + Z 1
1
1
(   1)

 1bh()d + Z 1
1
Z 1
a
p

f(p)dpbh()d()
The rst term is
Z 1
0
Z F 1()
e 
pf(p)dpbh()d = Z 1
0
Z F 1()
e 
1

dpbh()d = Z 1
0

F 1()

  e
 


e d =
Z 1
0

e +

  e
 


e d
=
1

e 
 
+ e    1
The second term is
Z 1
0
(   1)

e d = 
Z 1
0
1

e  (   1) d
= Ei (1)  Ei () + e 
The third term is
Z 1
1
Z 1
a
p

f(p)dpbh()d() = Z 1
1
Z 1
a
1

dpe d =
Z 1
1

1

  e
 


e d =

Ei ()
 
e    11
1
= Ei (1)  e    1  Ei ()  e    1
Plotting the expected price paid as a function of  = 2m we get the following
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Equivalently we can plot the expected price paid as a function of m.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
m
y
Expected price (red) and expected actually paid price (green) as functions of m
5.3.2 Market structure (B); Large and small rms are at two separate locations
We next consider price and expected utilities when the small rms are located together in one location
but separately from the large rm. Kultti (2008) considered a model with small sellers and showed that
they prefer to locate close together to locating separately. We proceed to nd equilibrium prices and
expected utilities in this case.
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Assume that fraction z of buyers go to small rms and fraction 1  z go to the large rm. The small
rms will in this case price using a mixed strategy with support [a; 1],and the large rm quotes price
PB . As before, it is clear that F (1) = 1.
A rm quoting price A can then expect to get A  (1   bH( 1z )). As the expected prot must be the
same over the support we easily nd that
a = 1  bH(1
z
) = 1  (1  e z ) = e z
A small rm asking price  2
h
e 

z ; 1
i
can thus expect


1  bH F ()
z

= e 

z (74)
From this we solve
1  e
 z

= 1  e F ()z
,  F ()
z
=  
z
  log()
Thus
F () =
z



z
+ log()

= 1 +
z

log() (75)
A large rm can expect the following prot
PB
Z 1
0
(1  z)e d = (PB) (76)
To continue we rst look at the expected utilities of buyers that go to the small rms. The small
rms price using mixed strategies. To make calculations easier we follow Kultti (2008) and assume that
all sellers charge the expected price. We denote the expected utility of buyers visiting the small rms
by u(z; F ): A buyer going to a large seller knows that he can expect to get 1  PB :
In equilibrium the following must hold:
u(z; F ) = 1  PB (77)
and
0(PB) = 0: (78)
Next we look at the small rmspricing decision. We pretend that every small rm asks the same
price r. We get
r
Z 1
z
0
z
1
e d +

e 

z

r = e 

z : (79)
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From this we solve the small sellers expected price
r =
e 

z
e 

z

+
R 1
z
0
z
1 e
 d
(80)
Then the buyersexpected utility conditional on being alive is
(1  r)
"Z 1
z
0
g () d +
Z 1
1
z
1
z
g () d
#
; (81)
where g() = h()E() :
The buyer must be indi¤erent between visiting the large rm and going to the small rms.
(1  r)
"Z 1
z
0
g () d +
Z 1
1
z
1
z
g () d
#
= 1  PB (82)
it is clear that PB  1.
Using (80) we write 1  r as
1  r =
R 1
z
0
z
1 e
 d
e 

z +
R 1
z
0
z
1 e
 d
=
z
   ze 
1
z
 
1
z+ 1

e 

z + z   ze 
1
z
 
1
z+ 1
 (83)
=   1
z   ze  1z

ze 
1
z   z + e  1z

(84)
Now we look at the rest of the LHS of (82). Remembering that g() = h()E() we getZ 1
z
0
g () d +
Z 1
1
z
1
z
g () d
=
Z 1
z
0
bh()
E()
d +
Z 1
1
z
1
z
bh()
E()
d (85)
= 
 Z 1
z
0
e d +
1
z
Z 1
1
z
e d
!
(86)
=  e  1z

1
z
+ 1

+ 1 + 
1
z
e 
1
z (87)
= 1  e  1z (88)
We can now rewrite the buyers indi¤erence condition (77) as
1  PB =   1
z   ze  1z

ze 
1
z   z + e  1z



1  e  1z

(89)
=  1
z

ze 
1
z   z + e  1z

(90)
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Thus
PB = 1 +
1
z

ze 
1
z   z + e  1z

: (91)
The large rm maximizes
max
PB
Z 1
0
(1  z) e d  PB
The rst order conditions are:
Z 1
0
(1  z) e d  
Z 1
0
dz
dPB
e d  PB = 0 (92)
We get dzdPB by totally di¤erentiating the buyers indi¤erence condition. Rewriting the buyers indif-
ference condition (89) we get
1  PB + 1
z

ze 
1
z   z + e  1z

= 0 (93)
Totally di¤erentiating the expression we get
@
@z

1
z

ze 
1
z   z + e  1z

= 1z3
2e 
1
z
dPB f 1g+ dz

1
z3
2e 
1
z

= 0
From which we solve
dz
dPB
=
1
1
z3
2e 
1
z
=
z3
2e 
1
z
(94)
Therefore the rst order condition becomesZ 1
0
(1  z) e d  
Z 1
0
z3
2e 
1
z
e d  PB = 0 (95)
Solving for PB we get
PB =
(1  z)

2e 
1
z

z3
(96)
We solve for z by equating (91) and (96). The only real root between zero and one is
:
z =
3
s
1
2
2 +
7
54
3 +
r
1
36
6 +
7
54
5 +
1
4
4   2
9
2
3
r
1
2
2 + 754
3 +
q
1
36
6 + 754
5 + 14
4
  1
3

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The expected price paid in the market is
(1  z)  PB + z 
 Z 1
z
0
Z F 1(z)
a
qf(q)dqbh()d + Z 1
1
z
Z 1
a
qf(q)
1

dqbh()d! (97)
where F 1(z) = q = e
1
z(z 1) and a=e 

z and z is as dened in ().
The expected price paid simplies to
(1  z)

1 +
1
z

ze 
1
z   z + e  1z

+z

1

e 
1
z

  z + ze  1z

+ z

e 
1
z   1

Ei (1)  Ei

1
z


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When  = 12 the expected price paid is 0:454 55 and when  = 0:05 the expected price paid is
0:839 23.
5.3.3 Market structure (C); all rms in di¤erent locations
Now assume that all rms are in di¤erent locations. Assume that proportion z of buyers visit the small
rms and proportion 1-z visit the large seller. In equilibrium the buyers are indi¤erent between visiting
the large rm or mixing over the small rms.
In equilibrium the price of the small sellers is15
q =
R1
0
 
1  e z   ze ze dR1
0
(1  e z)e d =
z
z + 
(98)
By going to the small rms a buyer thus expects to get
(1  q)
Z 1
0
 
1  e z
z
g()d =
1
E()
Z 1
0
e zbh()d
= 2
Z 1
0
e (z+)d (99)
=
2
(z + )
2 (100)
where the rst equality follows from g() = h()E() :
In equilibrium a buyer has to be indi¤erent between visiting a small seller or the large seller. Thus
1  PC = 
2
(z + )
2
Thus the large rms price is
PC = 1  
2
(z + )
2
The large rms price is found by maximizing the large rms expected prot with respect to z.
The large rm maximizes
max
z

PC  (1  z) 1


(101)
= max
z
 
1  
2
(z + )
2
!
(1  z)

(102)
15 It is well known that without a large rm the small rms have a unique symmetric price in this kind of a directed
search model. The inclusion of a large rm changes this price only through z. As z is unique given expected demand so
is q.
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Solving for z we get
z =
3
s
2 + 3 +
r
28
27
6 + 25 + 4     1
3
2
3
r
2 + 3 +
q
28
27
6 + 25 + 4
By charging P the large rm expects to get
1

 
2
(z + )
2   1
!
(z   1)
By deviating to q the large rm would get
z
z + 
1

Thus a deviation is not protable as 
2
(z + )
2   1
!
(z   1)  z
z + 
> 0:
The expected price in this market is thus
z
z+
m+ 1
+

2
(z+)2
  1

(z   1)m
m+ 1
z
z+( 2m )
m+ 1
+

( 2m )
2
(z+( 2m ))
2   1

(z   1)m
m+ 1
= m
z
(mz + 2)
2
(m+ 1)
  m2z2 +m2z   3mz + 4m+ 2
When m=3 this is 0:363 01.
The expected price actually paid takes into account that by going to a small rm a buyer gets the
good with probability
2
z
Z 1
0
 
1  e z e d = 
z + 
:
Thus the expected price actually paid is
37
z
(z + )
2 z + (1  z)
 
1  
2
(z + )
2
!
:
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